Silencing the Truth About Kosovo Apartheid

At the beginning of the year the mandate of former international ombudsman for Kosovo Marek Antoni Nowicki was not extended. With his departure, the institution of ombudsman lost its international character and the general international community has been prevented from hearing about human rights abuses in Kosovo and Metohija. The following is an excerpt from the translated interview from Serbian weekly Vreme (Time) with Mr. Nowicki, published on September 14, 2006.
Complete Shutdown of Cooperation
VREME: A large number of ethnically motivated crimes have been committed during the UN protectorate in Kosovo. Do you have information how many perpetrators have been found and sanctioned?
M. A. Nowicki: Very few. In Kosovo police can find information on who committed a crime but they can’t get evidence and witnesses. No one wants to testify because testifying in Kosovo, not just about ethnically motivated crimes, is very dangerous. The consequences of testifying against someone can be horrendous. Furthermore, the short mandates and constant rotation of international police are yet another, crucial factor of ineffectiveness, as is the closed nature of Kosovo society. It is difficult to establish cooperation with the population, especially in cases of ethnically motivated crimes where there is a complete shutdown of cooperation.
Crime Permitted in Kosovo
VREME: Does this create a sense that crime is permitted?
M. A. Nowicki: Yes. On the one hand, there is the problem of the ineffectiveness of organs that are supposed to prevent this, on the other, there are also objective difficulties. One of the problems of the international police is that they are people coming from different environments and cultures who don’t really have a good understanding of the environment (in Kosovo). On the other hand, the Kosovo police lacks experience. Additionally, they live among the people who are involved in crime, they themselves are under constant pressure and in real danger. When all these factors are put together, the results can’t be different than they are.
VREME: How many participants in the March violence were prosecuted by the Kosovo justice system?
M. A. Nowicki: A few of the minor perpetrators were sanctioned but not the ones who committed the serious crimes, let alone the ones who organized the expulsions. The statistics look impressive but when one looks at them more closely, it is obvious they are only the minor perpetrators.
VREME: Why is that?
M. A. Nowicki: Without getting into whether there was any will to sanction those crimes, which would involve speculation and I have no evidence to back that up, some of the objective circumstances need to be taken into account. In mass events the focus is on prevention and it is difficult to collect evidence at the same time. What’s left afterwards is witnesses and then we go back to the story about witnesses in Kosovo.
In Case of Pogrom Use the Cellphones
VREME: Were police forces and KFOR up to the task on March 17?
M. A. Nowicki: The real question is how was it possible for all this to escape a large number of various UNMIK and KFOR services concerned with security as well as a large number of intelligence agencies from various countries. Kosovo is a land with the highest number of intelligence agents per capita in the world; surely they must have known what was in the works. They are responsible for following the security situation in Kosovo on an hour-by-hour basis. And what happened? They knew nothing. That’s incredible. We can’t help but wonder whether they were taking their job seriously.
It’s interesting that in spring 2004 I had information of the existence of a plan to reduce the number of KFOR troops by the beginning of July, leaving about 2,000 troops still deployed in Kosovo and making their presence symbolic.
VREME: Taking into account that these are serious security agencies, should we doubt their objectivity?
M. A. Nowicki: Some things cannot be explained rationally. For example, two weeks before March 17 I sent a letter to the KFOR commander, General Kammerhof, asking for an explanation for the removal of security checkpoints in some Serb enclaves, questioning the reasons and other possible security measures for these people, who lived in fear. At first they didn’t want to answer at all and they were displeased with the fact that the information had been released to the public; then they answered that the situation was improving, that there is a Kosovo police that is well-trained and capable of protecting them, and that people who feel unsafe should ask for cell phones from the municipality so they can report when they are in danger.
Abandoned Dog and the Albanian Looter
At that time I visited several Serb locations where KFOR checkpoints were removed, among them Vucitrnska Slatina. It was clear to the people with whom I spoke there that the removal of the checkpoints was to be their end. A man with whom I spoke told me, “Sir, there are no arguments for the removal of the checkpoints; we know that, we live here.”
The first place I visited after March 17 was Vucitrnska Slatina. I wanted to check what I had been told two weeks earlier. Everything was completely destroyed, I found just two living beings there: one was (the man’s) dog, who recognized us because we had had coffee and honey there just two weeks ago, and the other was an Albanian from nearby who was taking away looted items. It all seemed symbolic: the torched houses, some of them still smoldering, the abandoned dog among the ruins, and the Albanian looter.
Entire Interview with Kosovo Ombudsman Marek Antoni Nowicki, Corruption and makeshift arrangement.