So, Who is Really Behind the Assassination of Zoran Djindjic?
According to the official storyline, the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic in March 2003 was a plot both planned and carried out by the commander of the Special Operations Unit (JSO) of Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Milorad Ulemek Legija because, in one version, Zoran Djindjic was a traitor of Serbian nation who had to be physically eliminated in order to stop the total dissolution of Serbian state or, in another, Djindjic planned to destroy the underground structures with which JSO was involved, so his assassination had nothing to do with patriotism, but was a pure execution by the mafia, eager to preserve its safety.
But the trial of former JSO members, including Zvezdan Jovanovic who allegedly pulled the trigger and Legija, charged with planning and organizing the assassination, marred by the accusations of being a political show staged in order to end the rumors and give a sacrificial offering which would close the book on Djindjic's assassination, abysmally failed to satisfy a number of those who continue to claim that both foreign secret services and certain political circles in Belgrade closely tied to those services are the true perpetrators of the murder of Serbian prime minister.
Although loathed for his shameful role during NATO aggression on Serbia, for handing former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to Hague Inquisition (and execution) and for demanding that Dr. Vojislav Seselj also gets removed from the political scene in Serbia by the Hague -- even going as far as rigging the charges against Seselj and preparing his indictment in order to have the most severe political threat, Serbian Radical Party, rendered powerless and insignificant; although Djindjic was unquestionably a ruthless politician with insatiable lust for power and no compassion for anyone he considered an obstacle to his ambitions, there is one thing which Zoran Djindjic, as resolute, uncompromising and lethally efficient as he was, was determined not to let go: Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija.
The cracks in a love affair between Western power centers and Djindjic, that started to appear right after he delivered President Milosevic to the Hague, when Djindjic, in spite of the thunderous uproar by the Sorosiada phlegm from Belgrade's NGO gutters, introduced religious classes in schools, gathered donations for the grandiose Saint Sava Church in Serbian capital and stunned Washington and Brussels by requesting the return of Serbian security forces to Kosovo province, as stipulated by the UN SC Resolution 1244, have grown deeper towards that fateful March in 2003, culminating just few weeks ahead of his assassination, when Serbian premier announced there will be no more foreign meddling in Serbian internal affairs and declared a political war against the part of the so-called "international community" striving to sever Kosovo province from Serbia.
On February 21, 2003, 20 days before being assassinated, Zoran Djindjic gave an interview to Serbian Portal in Banja Luka, Republic of Srpska, in which he shared some of his views. The question that remains is whether this unexpected turn from executing foreign diktat in Serbia, to focusing upon the Serbian national interests had cost him his life.
Zoran Djindjic: There Will be No New State on Serbian Territory
Translation of the interview late Premier Djindjic gave to "Serbian Portal" three weeks ahead of his assassination, also available on YouTube in two (overlapping) parts: Part 1, Part 2
Q: The key issue for Serbia is Kosovo and Metohija status. On February 4, Federation of Serbia and Montenegro was formed -- how does that affect the future status of Kosovo-Metohija, primarily the Resolution 1244?
ZDj: Forming the federation doesn't affect the Resolution in any significant way, because the federation is taking over everything that Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had, but the things that are being done on the ground are decisive. This Security Council Resolution has, simply put, taken away from Serbia the sovereignty attributes in Kosovo, that is the legislative, judicial and executive powers, as well as the security issues, saying "We will hold this in a depot of a sort, until the relations get normalized and then we shall see how to have these responsibilities shared by Belgrade and Pristina. This will not be as before, that this is a province within Serbia, but certainly not in the sense that Kosovo is independent." Everyone accepted this Resolution, including us. We said: Fine, temporarily the international community will have the sovereignty in Kosovo.
But, what is happening in the meantime? They [the "international community"] have opened this depot, this safe, and started to transfer these attributes onto local structures. So, now, you have the legislative power in entirety being sovereignly implemented by Pristina. Even the laws are being enacted -- all the laws, not only the ones pertaining to the autonomy, but the laws related to sovereignty. Take a look at the executive power -- they have the government which is completely autonomous in relation to Serbia; look at the judicial power, look at security... this entire process is moving in the direction of eventually transferring all the state attributes to the local Albanian structures. Then, at some point, the international community will say: "Let's see how will Belgrade and Pristina cooperate! We have created two completely separate legal, economic and political systems, and now the two of you work on harmonizing them! If you can't, we'll give you five years to talk. Ten, fifty... but during that time you are outside the European integrations." That is not acceptable.
So, once we realized that, on the one hand, there's talks about delaying the final status decisions up until the moment this will be possible to do peacefully, as the standards are being raised, as certain criteria are being implemented in Kosovo and Metohija, as the relations are getting normalized and, on the other, the actual state is being created behind the scene -- that's when I stirred the dust and triggered the alarm bells, because you can't do anything in the world, unless you create a crisis -- if there's no crisis, nobody pays attention. So, I created the crisis.
I said: We want to determine the status right away. They responded that "now is not the right time". Why not? Then, why are you making decisions about [the final status] on a daily basis if the time is not right? Why are you allowing Kosovo and Metohija parliament to decide about the issues regarding the economic system -- which is the prerogative of the central state, why are you transferring the security responsibilities on the Kosovo Protection Corps [former terrorist KLA], why are you determining the border crossings towards Albania, without asking Belgrade, if the time is not right?! "Oh, that is alright..." It is not alright, that can't be right!
Regardless of the Criticism and Appeals, We Won't Give Up
The first stage is creating the interest in the world public opinion to open this subject; the second stage is for us to propose our ides on solving this issue. There is a very simple solution to federalize Kosovo and Metohija in a way which would enable the Serbs to be recognized as a constitutive nation, with its own institutions within the joint institutions. And we would then, as Serbia, give time to such Kosovo to start functioning, if it can. If it can't, we move on to something else. If the Albanians do not want to treat Serbs as equals and as an ethnic community -- not an ethnic minority, then we need to see what are we going to do.
We must speak about this very openly, just like when one has a gangrene. The world is not in the mood for that, but I'm pleased to see that people in Serbia are much more interested in discussing this than I expected. This really is a heated and controversial subject, but I think that the leaders must open it -- not appease the public opinion, but to point to the problems and to say that this is where we have a problem. We can't keep closing our eyes before the public. I expect the issue of the final relations between Belgrade and Pristina to be presented on the international scene in June or July this year, so that during summer, in the fall at the latest, certain concepts and strategies are developed, in order to be able to take some essential steps before the next year.
But we won't give up. Regardless of the criticism and the appeals I have personally received from the number of the power centers not to rock the boat on this issue, we will continue this story. I told them: "No. I appreciate your priorities, your state interests, but don't ask me to adopt them as my own priorities. I understand and respect the fact you have the Iraq issue, but I have Kosovo. So, as I'm respectful to you, I expect you to respect me in turn." It will be difficult, but no major task can be accomplished without difficulties.
The Rights of Serbian State: Does Serbia Have Them or Not?
Q: Having in mind all you have just said, is there a realistic possibility for Kosovo to be severed from Serbia anyway?
ZDj: The worst possibility is to have Kosovo de facto independent and to have it then, as a millstone, as an "Albanian independent Kosovo", tied to our feet, telling us -- you are responsible for it, and until you harmonize those relations, you can't move on. This would mean we've been excluded from the history for all times. To have them tell us tomorrow: "Since you are the same state, you have to allow Albanian businessmen to shop through Serbia, to take part in privatizations" and so on. The fact you can't go and have a cup of coffee in Pristina or in Prizren, well, those are the "incidents". Those are just some individuals, extremists, but you are not like that, you are "reasonable". "Let them buy Terazije [downtown square in Belgrade] with their narco-dollars and billions they have, let them buy the energy power plants and let Serbia become an Albanian state tomorrow." That is not going to happen. We will prevent this.
We want to resolve the issue of involvement of Serbian state in Kosovo and Metohija. The international community is trying to reduce this issue to the question of the rights of expelled Serbs and as the "national minority". The international community is substituting one for the other, as if that solves the state problem. Even if Serbs would have all the rights in Kosovo and Metohija -- which is impossible, this still hadn't even touched upon the Serbian state rights. We want to have an improvement on both tracks: on the one side, of course, to have the expelled Serbs return and that those few who haven't been expelled yet, have safety. But also, on the other hand, the state of Serbia has to have its own rights clearly defined. Or, not to have its rights, but then the Security Council has to say "Serbia has no rights, Security Council has granted independence to Kosovo".
We are not going to go to war with Security Council, but we shall know where we stand. What we have right now is the worst thing, the white death: you are in the snow, you think you're fine, but you're actually slowly dying. You must wake up, because the moment you do you are saying No, I'm in danger. Kosovo is still a danger for the Serbian state, because it is a wound that can drain our last drop of blood. We have to close that wound in the best way for ourselves, but we are prepared for a certain compromise which would take care of the other side's interests, of those Albanians who live in Kosovo.
If Serbia Has No Right to the Inviolability of Borders, Other Yugoslav Republics' Borders Must be Reevaluated Anew
Q: Your Kosovo offensive actually began by widening the Province issue onto the entire region. Your statement given to 'Spiegel' regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina stirred a lot of reactions...
ZDj: I said that if what was agreed in Dayton does not apply to Serbia -- that the national communities of former Yugoslavia have been given their collective status and that the borders are inviolable, if that does not apply to Serbia, it will not apply to anyone else either, going backwards. If that applies to Serbia as well, then how do you explain the fact that the only precedent was made precisely in Serbia?!
I said that I am for upholding Dayton Accord, but let us find a compromise through the regional cooperation, through the bilateral cooperation of Albanians in Kosovo with Albania, Serbs with Serbia, Republic of Srpska with Serbia, Croat part of Bosnia with Croatia -- without changing the borders, without raising the question of sovereignty, to have the free movement of people and business. However, if you want to create an Albanian state in the 21st century on the territory which belongs to the Serbian state, then you will open up anew the process you thought you have closed for good. This is not my wish, this is a diagnosis.
I often feel like a messenger bringing the bad news, but let me warn you when you don't know this will happen. So, the dissolution of Dayton Agreement is like a law of gravity, that will be the consequence. That is a warning for those who think they can destroy a certain principle in Serbia, which was accepted by the Serbs [in other republics] even though it was harmful to Serbs. The historical opportunity to point to the fact that the nations in this region have accepted this principle of inviolability of borders, collective rights, peaceful coexistence between the ethnic communities, citizens, minorities... shouldn't be passed up. I think my approach was entirely constructive, although it caused quite unjustified nervousness in Sarajevo, and a lot of nervous reactions in Washington, and it wasn't well received in Brussels, either. But that is how things are.
A Good Test to Learn the Truth About Our "Friends"
They questioned my motives [to raise the issue of Dayton]. Some said that these are "marketing" motives. What on earth would I need marketing for now? There are no elections in Serbia now, nor do I expect to get the international support for my stand. I have personally lost much more than I gained, but I did so consciously: I have invested the credit I gained as a democratic leader in the Balkans on one thing which is, for me, the matter of national interest.
If my friends abroad say: You disappointed us now!, then they are not my friends. Because if I tell them this one thing is important to me, it is important to my country and I ask them to support me in this, but they come back and say: No, we support you only when it comes to the things that are important to us, then they are not my friends. So, this will be a very good test to see who really supports us, and who "supports us" only to put us to sleep and to prevent us from solving our problems.
Boorish Ambassadors and Serbian Inferiority Complexes
Q: So, as far as I understand, you hold that you are the one making decisions in Serbia, and not those from abroad?
ZDj: Absolutely. The decisions about Serbia will be reached in the Serbian Parliament and in the appropriate state institutions. All those earlier stories and the former "crisis groups" and "crisis headquarters" are now over. There is no chance for us to accept anything that goes against our interest.
There is certain mystification in our media which surprises me when I read every day, for example, whom Americans support, who has the backing of Europe, or of Russia... Who cares?! The right question is whom do the people living in this country back. What has that to do -- who has the backing of someone abroad, with the political reality in one state. One can and should have good relations with everyone, but to involve the foreigners in our internal politics, that is sick. We still suffer from this sickness in Belgrade. We have ambassadors of certain countries who behave like they are leaders of the Serbian political parties, as if they were elected in our elections! They are calling the ministers, they are calling my cabinet and they are in shock because I won't receive them. I tell them: Imagine if my ambassador in your country calls your premier to have a lunch with him! Your prime minister would think it's a joke, a hidden camera. Well, we are the state just like your country, do not assume you can do in our country the things our embassy in your country couldn't dream of doing.
But we also have to adopt that attitude as citizens, to respect ourselves and not to let anyone from the outside interfere in our relations. Because, if we weren't asking for it, they wouldn't be doing it. If we had the ministers who would respond to such calls by simply saying: Sorry, I have no time for that, they would give up after few attempts. But since we still suffer from this inferiority complex, I think we also help generate this immature situation in which our country is much more discussed about abroad then the similar states, like Romania, Croatia, Greece... I don't see why would Serbia be in a different position than the other countries.